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Abstract—We consider users which may have renewable energy
harvesting devices, or distributed generators. Such users can
behave as consumer or producer (hence, we denote them as
prosumers) at different time instances. A prosumer may sell the
energy to other prosumers in exchange of money. We consider a
demand response model, where the price of conventional energy
depends on the total demand of all the prosumers at a certain
time. A prosumer depending on its own utility has to select the
amount of energy it wants to buy either from the grid or from
other prosumers, or the amount of excess energy it wants to sell
to other prosumers. However, the strategy, and the payoff of a
prosumer inherently depends on the strategy of other prosumers
as a prosumer can only buy if the other prosumers are willing to
sell. We formulate the problem as a coupled constrained game,
and seek to obtain the generalized Nash equilibrium. We show
that the game is a concave potential game and show that there
exists a unique generalized Nash equilibrium. We consider that a
platform will set the price for distributed interchange of energy
among the prosumers in order to minimize the consumption
of the conventional energy. We propose a distributed algorithm
where the platform sets a price to each prosumer, and then each
prosumer at a certain time only optimizes its own payoff. The
prosumer then updates the price depending on the supply and
demand for each prosumer. We show that the algorithm converges
to an optimal generalized Nash equilibrium. The distributed
algorithm also provides an optimal price for the exchange market.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problems of the peak demand, and the uncertainty of
the demand and supply are challenging the traditional power
grid. The integration of the renewable energy into the system
has increased the uncertainty because of the randomness of
renewable energy generation. The ever increasing use of the
electric vehicles have also increased the demand of the users.
Demand response mechanism has been proposed where time-
of-use price is primarily used to shift the peak load during the
off-peak times. However, those approaches assume that the
users are price takers and do not consider the strategy of the
other users. A consumer may consume a higher load, however
the marginal price for each increment is the same. Those prices
are set with an estimate of a users’ demands. However, in the
real time, the user’s demand may be quite different from the
estimate, and thus, the cost or the peak load may still be large.
The continuing proliferation of the distributed energy re-
sources (e.g., PV arrays, solar rooftops, energy storage units)
have transformed the notion of traditional users of energy.
The consumers can now also produce, and reduce the burden
of the grid. Other users can buy the energy directly from
those intermittent sellers. We denote the consumers with the
capability of producing energies as prosumers. The prosumers
can exchange necessary energies among themselves. The pro-
liferation of the secure distributed database such as blockchain
can facilitate such an exchange. Such local exchange is also
useful as the transmission loss will be lower as compared to
the scenario where the grid has to serve the users. However,
a proper incentive is required for prosumers to participate for
exchanging energy with others.
Thus, a proper pricing mechanism is required which will
facilitate the exchange of energies among the prosumers, and
will decrease demand of the conventional energy from the
grid. Further, the pricing mechanism has to be computation-
ally simple, because the exchange has to be taken place in
real time. The determination of a proper exchange price is
challenging. This is because of the uncertain nature of the
renewable energy. Further, the utilities of each prosumer are
also unknown. Finally, the exchange price should be set with
an objective to reduce the overall cost or the peak demand of
the grid. Hence, the exchange between the prosumers will not
depend on the price at a certain time but also on the exchange
prices at other times. The exchange will also depend on the
prices of conventional energy which has to be bought from the
grid. This paper seeks to consider these interactions to propose
a pricing mechanism for prosumers where the prosumers can
exchange among themselves.
We consider a scenario where the prosumers can sell ener-
gies to other prosumers. The time is slotted. Each prosumer has
certain demand to be fulfilled. Some demands are deferrable,
i.e., the prosumer only cares about the total demand to be
fulfilled over multiple time slots. Each prosumer may also have
a renewable energy harvesting device, and a storage device.
Given the exchange price, the prices of the conventional
energy, and the renewable energy prediction, each prosumer
decides how much to buy from the conventional energy from
the grid, how much to store, how much to sell (if any) to
other prosumers, and how much to buy from other prosumers
at each instance. The prosumers are selfish entities which only
want to maximize their own payoffs.
We consider that there exists a platform which sets the
exchange price. Examples of platform may be the load serving
entity (LSE), or the aggregator, or a private retailer1. The
platform wants to maximize the amount of exchange such
that the overall consumption of the conventional energy is
reduced. However, as mentioned before, finding the optimal
1Recently, there are private retailers which are providing exchange service
among the distributed generators[1].
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pricing strategy is inherently challenging because the platform
does not know the exact utilities of the prosumers.
We consider a real-time price for the conventional energy.
The Independent system operator (ISO) sets a price which is a
linear function of the consumption of all the users. The price
is realized when the loads of all the users are provided to the
ISO. Thus, each prosumer has to consider the strategy of other
prosumers since the price inherently depends on the actions of
other prosumers. The key characteristic of the pricing strategy
is that the price is set in a dynamic manner, and depends on
the total consumption of the conventional energies across the
users. We, thus, focus on finding the exchange price which
will reduce the overall consumption of the peak load.
Since the prosumers are selfish entities, we use a game
theoretic model to characterize the interaction among the pro-
sumers. Each prosumer selects its best response by anticipating
the behavior of others. However, the strategy space is also
dependent on the strategy of the other prosumers. For example,
the maximum energy bought by a prosumer (A, say) from a
prosumer (B, say) is limited by the amount the prosumer B
wants to sell at a certain time. Different prosumers may not sell
all the excess energy, rather, they can store the energy and sell
it only during the peak period. Thus, finding an equilibrium
strategy is inherently challenging. We resort to the concept of
generalized Nash equilibrium.
We show that the game is a potential game. In fact, the
potential game is strictly concave when the utility functions
of the users is strictly concave, and thus, admits a unique
generalized Nash equilibrium. However, the above equilibrium
is not an optimal solution of the scenario where the sum of
the prosumers’ utilities are maximized. In other words, the
equilibrium is not an efficient one, however, if the renewable
energy generation is high, the efficiency is also high.
Subsequently, we propose a distributed algorithm to find
the equilibrium, and the optimal price the platform should set
for the exchange of energy. In the algorithm, the platform
first sets a low price for each prosumer. Each prosumer then,
decides the total load, the amount of energy to be bought
from other prosumers, and the amount of energy to be sold.
While taking its decision, a prosumer takes the strategy of the
previous iteration of other prosumers as an estimate of the
current strategy of the prosumers. Thus, a prosumer does not
need to know the utilities of other prosumers. The platform
then increases the exchange price by an  amount for those
prosumers for which the supply is less than the demand. The
process continues till the supply of all the prosumer all exceeds
the demand.
We show that such a simple distributed algorithm converges
to the equilibrium strategy of the prosumers using the concept
of the fictitious play. The exchange price also converges
to the optimal price which maximizes the overall exchange
of energy among the prosumers. The convergence is also
in the exponential order. We, empirically, show that such a
pricing strategy reduces the conventional energy consumption
in Section V.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
Demand response pricing has already been studied [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6], [7]. The analysis of all these papers is based
on the assumption that consumers are price takers. They find
the optimal price based on the estimated demand profile of
the consumers. However, in real time, the consumers may
consume more as compared to the estimate. The consumers
will still pay a marginal price according to the demand which
has been estimated a priori. We consider a real time pricing
mechanism where the price is set based on the real time total
demand. Thus, the users (prosumers) have to strategize their
demand based on the anticipation of the strategy of the other
users. The above papers also did not consider the scenario
where the users can sell energies among themselves in a
separate market setting.
Real time pricing has been considered recently [8], [9],
[10], [11], [12]. [13] proposed a game theoretic model where
the consumers face a price which varies depending on the
total load to the grid. However, the above papers did not
consider the exchange market which is considered in our
work. The game is now a coupled constrained game, where
the constraints of each user (prosumer) also depends on the
other prosumers’ decisions since the a consumer can only
know the amount a prosumer wants to share. Thus, an optimal
exchange price is required which will enhance the exchange
of energy among the prosumers. Finally, [13] did not consider
the temporal correlation of the demand of the users. The utility
of the users, and the demand of the users often have temporal
correlation. For example, in the EV charging, the users may
need a certain amount of charged battery before a certain
deadline. The consumption of conventional energy, and the
exchange of energy thus, will also depend on the prices across
a certain horizon. Finally, each prosumer may also have a
storage device, and thus, may defer the selling of energy at a
later time if the selling price is higher.
Energy exchange among the users in a micro-grid setting has
been considered [14], [15], [16], [17]. The papers considered
that the buyers and sellers will exchange energy among each
other by bidding asking price, and selling price respectively.
However, the price of the conventional energy is assumed to
be fixed and independent of the amount of energy exchanged
among the buyers and sellers. However, the price for the
conventional energy may also drop if the total demand of
conventional energy is low. Further, the above papers assumed
that the demand consists of non-deferrable loads. However, in
practice users may defer the consumption of energy if it is
better to exchange energy when the exchange price is high. We
provide an equilibrium strategy of the users considering the
real time pricing mechanism where the price increases based
on the total consumption (rather than a fixed price), and we
also provide pricing strategies to the platform for the exchange
market.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we will describe the pricing behavior (Sec-
tion III-A), prosumer’s utility functions (Section III-B), the
constraints every prosumer has to satisfy (Section III-C). Fi-
nally, we formulate the optimization problem for the prosumer
decision (Section III-D).
A. Pricing structure
We assume that the time is slotted. Each prosumer can
act either as producer or consumer in a slot. Prosumers also
decide how much to sell (producer) or buy (consumer) in the
exchange market. The prosumers wants to decide its demand
over a certain time horizon T (e.g., over a day, or over 8-9
hours period). Let the number of prosumers be N . Note that a
prosumer does not need to have energy generation capability.
Let li,t be the demand of prosumer i to grid at during time
[t, t+ 1). The price selected by the ISO for the consumption
of conventional energy is denoted as
pt(
∑
i
li,t) = γt
∑
i
li,t (1)
where li,t is the demand of the prosumer i to the grid at time
t. Note that
∑
i li,t is the total load of the grid at time t. γt is
the parameter that is selected by the grid and depends on the
time of the day. How the grid should select γt is out of scope
for this paper and left for the future. Note that setting a price
which varies linearly with the total demand is quite common
in the literature [13], [18].
Note that the price of the grid not only depends on the load
of the user i, but also on the loads of the other prosumers.
The price is realized only when the load of all the prosumers
is known. Thus, it leads to a game among the users, where
the payoff inherently depends on the strategies chosen by the
other users. A user is not aware of the exact demand of the
other users, thus, it leads to an incomplete information game.
Note that unlike the price which is independent of the total
load, in the price strategy stated in (1), there will always be
an upper limit of the load. This is because a user will try to
resist consuming too much energy. The price is the same to
all buyers of conventional energy.
Exchange Price: We assume that there is a platform which
sets the prices for exchange among the prosumers. The pro-
sumers select the amount of energy to be sold at different times
in a blockchain. The prosumers also updates the amount of
energy to be bought from other prosumers in a blockchain. If
the prosumer i buys energy from prosumer j it pays an amount
µj,t per unit of energy during time [t, t + 1). The platform
obtains a fixed fee for every unit of energy exchanged. Hence,
the platform will want to maximize the overall amount of
energy to be exchanged among the prosumers. However, an
incentive has to be provided to the prosumers to sell the excess
energy to other prosumers.
B. Prosumer’s payoff
We, now, compute the expression of each prosumer’s payoff.
Let the prosumer i buys qi,j,t amount of energy from prosumer
j during [t, t+ 1). Let the prosumer i sells an amount of si,t
during the time duration. Let the prosumer i’s demand (or,
total consumption) during time duration [t, t+ 1) be di,t. The
user’s utility Ui only depends on the consumption di,t.
Let the prosumer i’s demand (or, total consumption) during
time duration [t, t + 1) be di,t. The user’s utility Ui only
depends on the consumption di,t. Thus, the user’s profit of
total payoff is
T∑
t=1
µi,tsi,t −
∑
j 6=i
µj,tqi,j,t − li,tγt(
∑
i
li,t) + Ui(di,t) (2)
The user’s2 payoff inherently depends on the decision of
the other users. Note that the amount of energy a prosumer
buys from the other prosumers also inherently depends on the
amount of energy sold by the prosumer.
Assumption 1. We assume that Ui(·) is concave, and contin-
uous.
User’s preference (or, comfort) increases with the consump-
tion. However, the rate of increase of preference decreases with
the demand di,t. The utility function is randomly drawn from
a distribution. The ISO or the other prosumers are unaware
of the exact utility of a prosumer. However, there may be a
correlation among the prosumers.
The utility may also have a temporal correlation. For exam-
ple, a prosumer can only attain a utility if the total demand is
satisfied within a deadline. The prosumer will have zero utility
if the demand is unsatisfied within the deadline. Such kind of
utility arises for the deferrable loads such as EV charging, or
dishwasher.
C. Problem Formulation: Constraints
In this subsection, we describe the system of constraints that
each prosumer has to satisfy while taking its own decision.
Some users may have a deferrable load such as EV charging,
and dishwasher. The demand only needs to be fulfilled within
a certain time. For example, the EV needs to be ready before 8
am (e.g., if the user is going to work). However, the individual
load may vary over time. We denote the set of deferrable
appliances as Ai. Suppose the load assigned to appliance j
of user i is xi,j,t for the time duration [t, t + 1). Hence, we
have
Tj∑
t=1
xi,j,t ≥ Xj∀i,∀j ∈ Ai (3)
where Xj is the amount of load required for appliance j.
Let the set of non-deferrable load of prosumer i is assumed
to be Bi. Let xi,j,t be the load for appliance j ∈ Bi. The user’s
total consumption during time [t, t+ 1) is thus
di,t =
∑
j∈Ai∪Bi
xi,j,t (4)
The demand of prosumer i has to exceed the demand for non-
deferrable appliances at each instance. Thus,
di,t,max ≥ di,t ≥ di,t,min (5)
where di,t,max, and di,t,min are known beforehand.
2In the sequel, we use the notation user and prosumer interchangeably.
Let the amount of energy sold to prosumer j by prosumer
i in the exchange market during time [t, t+ 1) be denoted as
si,j,t. The total amount of load sold by prosumer i si,t must
follow the following constraint.
si,t =
∑
j 6=i
si,j,t. (6)
Similarly, the energy bought by prosumer i from prosumer
j is denoted as qi,j,t during time [t, t+ 1). Thus,
qi,t =
∑
j
qi,j,t. (7)
The energy bought from user j must be smaller than the total
energy sold by user j. Also note that the sum of energies
bought by all the prosumers have to be equal to the energy
sold by prosumer j. Thus, we have∑
i
qi,j,t = sj,t∀j. (8)
Note that sj,i,t = qi,j,t.
Each prosumer has a renewable energy harvesting device
which harvests E¯i,t amount of energy 3 during time [t, t +
1). The prosumer i may also have a battery with capacity
Bi,max. If the prosumer does not have any battery then Bi,max
is 0. The state of the battery is Bi,t. The amount of energy
discharged from the battery is ei,t, and charged to the battery
is bi,t. Thus, we have
Bt+1 = Bt + E¯i,t − ei,t + bi,t (9)
Note that the renewable energy generation is a random process.
Hence, a prosumer will only have the estimate of E¯i,t, rather
than the exact realized value.
The state of the battery can not be less than 0. The state of
the battery is also required to be a specific value at the end of
the horizon. Most often, the state of the battery is kept to be
same as the start of the day. Thus, we have
BT+1 = B1, 0 ≤ Bt ≤ Bmax (10)
Note that, the energy bought from the grid as well as from
the other prosumers also have a transmission loss. Let ri,j ≤ 1
be the transmission efficiency between the users i and j, and
ri be the transmission efficiency between the user i and the
grid. Thus, the total consumption of prosumer i during time
[t, t+ 1) is given by
di,t =
∑
j
qi,j,tri,j − si,t + li,tri − bi,tηd + ei,tηc, (11)
where ηd ≤ 1 and ηc ≤ 1 are respectively the discharging, and
charging efficiency from the battery. Note that only a portion
of energy bought by the prosumer can be used because of the
transmission loss.
We assume that
Assumption 2. ri,j > ri for all i, and j.
3A prosumer may not have any renewable energy harvesting device. In that
case, the renewable energy will be 0.
We consider a geographically co-located prosumers. The
extension of our work for prosumers situated in a vast geo-
graphical area is left for the future. Generally, the transmission
efficiency from a neighbor prosumer should be high compared
to obtaining energy from the grid. This is because the grid
often times obtain energy from a far greater distance than the
distance between local neighbors.
D. The formulated problem
We are now ready to specify the optimization problem that
each prosumer solves for every time horizon [t, t+ T ).
Pi : maximize
T∑
t=1
µi,tsi,t −
∑
j 6=i
µj,tqi,j,t
−li,tγt(
∑
i
li,t) + Ui(di,t)
subject to (3)− (11).
var di,t, li,t, qi,t, si,t, ei,t,
bi,t, qi,j,t, si,j,t ≥ 0. (12)
The problem is convex when the prosumer knows others’
strategies. However, a prosumer is unaware of the strategies
set by other prosumers.
We must have qi,tsi,t = 0. Later, we propose an algorithm
which sets the prices in a way such that si,tqi,t = 0.
E. Platform’s Objective
The platform wants to maximize the exchange of energy
among the prosumers or minimize the conventional energy
consumption. Thus, the objective of the platform is the fol-
lowing
minimize
T∑
t=1
∑
i
li,t
var : µj,t ≥ 0∀j (13)
However, the platform does not know exact utility parameter,
and the user specific parameters such as the renewable energy
generation, and the battery capacity of the prosumers. Note
that the platform’s objective (cf.(13)) has to be minimized
carefully. If the exchange price is small enough the prosumers
will not sell. On the other hand, if the exchange price is large,
prosumers will not buy enough amount from the prosumers
who have excess energy. Thus, selecting the optimal µj,t is
challenging for the prosumers. In Section IV-D we show how
the prosumers should select the prices which will optimize the
above problem.
IV. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
Each prosumer is a selfish entity. It is only entitled to maxi-
mize its own payoff. The prosumer’s payoff inherently depends
on the other prosumers’ strategies. We, thus, formulate the
problem of prosumer’s decision as a game theoretic model.
We show that the problem is coupled constrained game since
the constraints of the prosumers are coupled. We seek to obtain
generalized Nash equilibrium. In Section IV-B we show that
the game admits a concave potential function, and, thus, there
exists a unique generalized Nash equilibrium. Leveraging on
the concave potential game, we propose a distributed algorithm
(Section IV-D) where each prosumer updates its strategy based
on the decision taken by the other prosumers in the previous
period. However, the equilibrium is not efficient as it does not
solve the problem where the objective is to maximize the sum
of the payoffs of the prosumers. We show that as the renewable
energy generation increases, the efficiency increases.
A. Nash Equilibrium
Each prosumer only wants to maximize its own payoff.
Each prosumer’s optimal decision depends on other users’
strategies. However, a user is not aware of the strategies of
other users. Hence, a game theoretical model is most apt to
find the strategy of a prosumer.
Definition 1. Let ai be the strategy of player i, and a−i be
the strategy vector of all players except player i.
In a game theoretic setting, Nash equilibrium is used as
an equilibrium concept. Naturally, the question arises whether
there exists a Nash equilibrium in the game. The Nash
equilibrium is defined in the following
Definition 2. The strategy profile (ai, a−i) is a Nash equilib-
rium strategy profile if the following holds E[ui(ai, a−i)] ≥
E[ui(a
′
i, a−i] for all i and a
′
i ∈ Si where Si is the set of
strategies of the player i.
If the strategy space of a player depends on the other
players, the game is known as coupled constrained game. The
generalized Nash equilibrium is the corresponding equilibrium
concept in the coupled constrained game.
Specifically, in a Nash equilibrium strategy profile, any
player can not have higher payoff by deviating unilaterally
from the prescribed strategy profile. In many games, a Nash
equilibrium may not exist. Even if the Nash equilibrium exists,
the question arises whether it is unique. If it is unique, the
question is whether it is practically implementable. Later, we
answer the above questions in an affirmative sense by applying
the theory of potential game.
We denote the set of strategy of prosumer i as ai,t, where
ai,t = {di,t,Qi,t, qi,t, si,t,Si,t, ei,t, bi,t, li,t}. Qi,t (Si,t, resp.)
consists of the component qi,j,t (si,j,t, resp.) for all j. The set
ai,t has to be feasible.
Note that because of the constraints in (8) the strategy space
of a prosumer also depends on the strategy of other prosumers.
Hence, the above game belongs to the coupled constrained
game. We, next, compute the generalized Nash equilibrium
using the concept of potential game.
B. Potential Game
We, now, show that the game is a potential game. First, we
introduce the definition of the potential game–
Definition 3. Suppose user i’s payoff function is ui(ai, a−i)
where ai is the strategy of user i, and a−i denotes strategies
of other users apart from user i. Then a game is potential, if
and only if there exists a function Φ such that ui(a′i, a−i) −
ui(ai, a−i) = Φ(a′i, a−i)− Φ(ai, a−i), ∀i.
If Φ(·) is concave (strictly) then the game is (strictly)
concave potential game [19].
In the following, we show that the game we introduced is
a potential game.
Theorem 1. The game is potential. If Ui(·) is strictly concave
∀i, then it is a strictly concave potential game, and thus, it
has a unique pure generalized Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let us assume that ui(ai, a−i) =
∑T
t=1 µi,tsi,t +
Ui(di,t) −
∑
j 6=i µj,tqi,j,t − li,tγt(
∑
i li,t) where ai is itself
a vector consisting of di,t, li,t, qi,t, si,t, et, bt. Now, consider
the following potential function
Φ(ai, a−i) =
∑
i
(
T∑
t=1
µisi,t + Ui(di,t)−
∑
j 6=i
µjqi,j,t + Ui(di,t))
−
T∑
t=1
γt
∑
i,j
li,tlj,t (14)
Φ(·) is a potential function since
ui(a
′, a−i)− ui(ai, a−i) = Φ(a′, a−i)− Φ(ai, a−i). (15)
Φ(·) is concave since Ui(·) is concave.
Thus, the equilibrium of the game is given by the optimal
solution of the potential function subject to the constraints.
We, now, state the optimization problem, the solution of
which will give the generalized Nash equilibrium.
Ppotential : maximize
∑T
t=1 µi,tsi,t + Ui(di,t)
−∑j 6=i µj,tqi,j,t − li,tγt(∑i li,t)
subject to (3)− (12). (16)
Since the potential game is concave, the solution of the
problem can be obtained using the convex optimization tool.
C. Efficiency of the equilibrium
We, now, investigate the efficiency of the generalized Nash
equilibrium obtained in the last section. Our result shows that
the game is not efficient. Specifically, the equilibrium strategy
profile of the game is not optimal for maximizing the sum of the
profits of the users.In the following we compute the efficiency
gap. Let
P : maximize
T∑
t=1
µi,tsi,t + Ui(di,t)−
∑
j 6=i
µj,tqi,j,t
− li,tγt(
∑
i
li,t)− γt(
∑
i
li,t)
2
subject to (3)− (12). (17)
Let ai,t = (li,t, si,t, qi,t, bi,t, ei,t, di,t) be the decision vector
for each user i at time t. The problem P is a convex
optimization problem as the objective function is concave, and
the constraints are linear.
We, next, introduce some notations.
Definition 4. Let a∗i,t be the optimal solution of the problem
P . Let aeqi,t be the equilibrium strategy profile. Specifically, it
is the optimal solution of Ppotential.
Now, we are ready to characterize the efficiency ratio of the
equilibrium strategy profile.
Definition 5. Let the objective value attained by the strategy
profile aeqi,t in the problem P be P
eq , and let P ∗ be the optimal
value. Then, the efficiency is
η =
P eq
P ∗
. (18)
The efficiency is always less than or equal to 1. Note that
in the equilibrium strategy profile, the user consumes larger
energy as compared to the optimal solution from the grid
because of the additional term.
Proposition 1. The efficiency decreases as the number of
prosumers increases.
The efficiency η increases as the amount of renewable
energy increases.
The above proposition shows that the efficiency increases
when the renewable energy supply increases. Thus, as the re-
newable energy penetration increases, the equilibrium becomes
closer to the optimal solution of the sum of the prosumers’
utility maximization problem.
If the load to the grid increases, the efficiency decreases.
However, the efficiency is never 0. It is always upper bounded
above 0. However, as the number of user increases the the
efficiency decreases.
D. Distributed Solution
Though Ppotential is a convex optimization problem, one
needs to know each prosumer’s utility, and constraints. Thus,
a centralized solution is difficult to obtain in practice. In this
section, we show that how a distributed algorithm converges
to the generalized Nash equilibrium.
Each user updates its strategy for a certain time horizon
T , which we denote as epoch. At epoch k, the prosumer
decides for the time slots kT + 1, . . . , (k+ 1)T . The platform
initially selects exchange prices µj,t for each prosumer j. The
prosumer then updates its strategy profile for each time slot
in the epoch. The platform then again updates the price until
the process converge. The algorithm ALGO-DIST is detailed
in the following
ALGO-DIST:
1) Initialization: For each prosumer i, the price is set at µ1i,t
at a some minimum possible value.
2) At iteration k ≥ 1, each prosumer i = 1, . . . N ,
updates its strategy by obtaining aki,t =
(lki,t, d
k
i,t, q
k
i,t, s
k
i,t, e
k
i,t, b
k
i,t), while solving the following
problem
maximize
T∑
t=1
µki,tsi,t + Ui(di,t)−
∑
j 6=i
µkj,tqi,j,t − li,tγtli,t
− γt
∑
j 6=i
lk−1i,t Ui(di,t)− 1/αk
T∑
t=1
||ai,t − ak−1i,t ||2
subject to (3), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12).
3) If si,t <
∑
j 6=i qj,i,t, set µ
k+1
i,t = µ
k
i,t + , if si,t ≥∑
j 6=i qj,i,t, set µ
k+1
i,t = µ
k
i,t, and go to step 2.
4) If si,t ≥
∑
j 6=i qj,i,t for all i, then exit.
5) The user i pays lki,tγt
∑
j l
k
j,t at time t to the grid, and
obtains the value of other users’ load.
Here, αk is the learning parameter, and it is set at 1/(k + 1).
The parameter puts a weight αk on the optimal decision of the
current stage. The above also ensures that the optimal decision
at the current iteration is not very far away from the decision
of the previous iteration.
Note that a prosumer does not have constraint in (8). Thus,
the prosumer is using a relaxed version of the problem since
the prosumer does not know the demand of a prosumer to
other prosumers. The price is set according to the total supply
and demand. In the converged solution, the constraint in (8)
is always satisfied.
The following shows that the above algorithm converges to
an equilibrium.
Theorem 2. The distributed algorithm ALGO-DIST termi-
nates after a finite number of iterations. The solution converges
to the optimal solution of the potential game for small enough
 > 0.
The price µi,t converges to the exchange price such that
the constraint in (8) is satisfied, and the platform’s objective
(cf.(13)) is minimized.
It is apparent that as  becomes smaller, the algorithm
converges to the solution of the potential game. Specifically,
the algorithm converges to the generalized Nash equilibrium.
Note that in the algorithm, each prosumer only needs
to know the load of the other users during the time slots
(k − 1)T + 1, . . . , kT for deciding its own decision. The
prosumer can obtain the information from the blockchain
where each prosumer updates its strategy. It does not need
to know the utility functions of the other users, their energy
surplus, or even the battery capacities. Thus, the algorithm is
easy to implement, and yet, it converges to the generalized
Nash equilibrium.
The user uses the data over the last epoch to obtain its
own decision in the current epoch. Surprisingly, a simple
algorithm converges to an equilibrium strategy. The above type
of strategy where a prosumer learns about the strategy of the
other prosumers, is known as fictitious play. Since the potential
function is strictly concave, the convergence is exponential
[20].
The platform updates the price for each prosumer depending
on the supply and demand for each prosumer. If the supply
exceeds demand for a prosumer, it will decrease the corre-
sponding price. On the other hand, if the demand is higher
than the supply, it will increase the price.
Note that each prosumer knows the value of γt while
updating its decision. γt is set by the ISO, and changes in a
longer time scale. Since the estimate of the renewable energy
generation changes in real time, the prosumer can update its
strategy at a minute scale. The convergence is exponential,
thus, the algorithm can be adopted dynamically to obtain the
prices. The initial price can be set at the lowest possible
price for the conventional energy, which will ensure that the
prosumers always try to buy from the exchange market.
The exchange prices are dynamic, and is different for each
prosumer. µi,t attained by Algorithm ALGO-DIST is the
maximum possible selling price in the exchange market which
will minimize the conventional energy consumption. It also
depends on the excess energy a prosumer has. During the peak
time, the conventional energy price is likely to be more. The
prosumers will be more likely to sell energies during that time.
The above has threefold advantages. First, the prosumers will
earn more. Second, the peak conventional energy demand will
also reduce. Finally, the price for the conventional energy will
also go down.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we show the equilibrium load profile, the
reduction of the conventional energy consumption, and the
efficiency of the generalized Nash equilibrium in an example
setting.
A. Parameter Setup
The conventional energy generation incurs a cost to the grid.
We assume that the cost function C(·) is a piece-wise quadratic
function
C(L) =
{
a1L
2 + c1, if L ≤ L1
a2L
2 + c2, else
For the simulation L1 is assumed to be 2MW. a1, c1 are taken
as 1. a2, c2 are taken as 2. The utility function of the prosumers
is defined in the following manner
Ui(d) = βtd− ζd2. (19)
where βt is a time-dependent random parameter which has a
Gaussian distribution of mean 0.3$/kW during the off-peak
period (for t ∈ [6, 9], t ∈ [13, 15]), and has a Gaussian
distribution of mean 0.6$/kW during the peak period (for
t ∈ [9, 12] and t[16, 18]). βt has a variance of 30 cents for
all t. ζ is assumed to be 0.1 $/(kW-h)2. We assume that γt is
the same across the day. More specifically, we set γt at 0.15
for all t apart from Fig. 4.
We assume that the renewable energy is one-sided normally
distributed with mean 2 kW and variance of 1 (kW)2. We
assume that the battery capacity is assumed to be 10kWh. We
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Fig. 1. The variation of efficiency of user’s equilibrium strategy profile.
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Fig. 2. Variation of the demand of conventional energy with T with exchange
market, and no exchange market for N = 50. The time [9, 12] is peak period,
rest is off-peak period.
use the Algorithm ALGO-DIST with  = 10−6 to obtain the
solution for our approach.
The transmission loss is assumed to be symmetric and equal
for each prosumer. Specifically, ri,j = 0.9 for all i and j.
The transmission loss between the grid and prosumers is also
assumed to be the same with ri = 0.8 for all i.
B. Results
1) Efficiency with number of prosumers: Our first result
(Fig. 1) shows the efficiency of the equilibrium strategy profile
with the number of prosumers. As the number of prosumers
increases, the efficiency decreases, however, the decrement
slows down when the number of prosumers exceeds a certain
threshold. The variation is non-linear and there is a lower
bound as shown in Theorem 2.
2) Impact of exchange market on the peak load: Fig. 2
shows that the exchange market reduces the peak demand by at
least 30%. When there is no exchange market, we assume that
the prosumers solve the problem with µi,t is set at a high value
for all i and t in the optimization problem P (cf. (17)). Thus,
the prosumers can only sell excess energies to the grid, or
use it at later time by storing in their batteries. However, even
the prosumers have the storage device, the exchange market
can greatly enhance the reduction of the peak load. This is
because the prosumers can sell energies to the other prosumers
in the peak time which reduces the peak load. The exchange
prices are also high during the peak time as the demand to the
prosumers increases during the peak time.
3) Increase of social welfare: The social welfare is defined
to be the difference between the utility function of the pro-
sumers and the cost function of the conventional energy. A
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Fig. 3. Variation of social welfare when there is an exchange market and
when there is no exchange market with the battery capacity.
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when there is no exchange market with γt = γ for all t, and N = 50.
higher social welfare is always beneficial. In fact, independent
system operator (ISO) wants to maximize the social welfare.
Fig. 3 shows the importance of the exchange market as
compared to the one with no exchange market. Fig. 3 shows
that the social welfare is at least 25% higher when there is no
exchange market. We assume that when there is no exchange
market the prosumers optimize with µi,t is set at a high
value in optimization problem P (cf. (17)) which precludes
any exchange among the prosumers. The reduction of the
social welfare is because of two factors. First, the transmission
efficiency is poorer between grid and the prosumers. Second,
the price paid by the prosumers is much higher when there
is no exchange market. As the storage capacity increases,
the difference is more significant. However, when the storage
capacity increases beyond a certain threshold, the difference
decreases. This is because for higher storage, the prosumers
become self sufficient.
4) Effect of γt: Note that the ISO should select γt in order
to maximize the overall social welfare. Fig. 4 shows that when
γt is small, the prosumers’ utility is higher as the prosumers
have to pay a lower payment. The cost of conventional energy
is higher as the demand of conventional energy will be higher
in the above scenario. However, as γt exceeds a threshold
the social welfare decreases because the prosumers have to
pay a higher amount which decreases the utility. The social
welfare is higher when there is exchange market compared to
the scenario when there is no exchange market for every value
of γt.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We consider a system of prosumers which can share their
excess energies among themselves in addition to buying
conventional energy from the market. We consider a linear
dynamic pricing for the conventional energy where the price
for the conventional energy depends on the total demand for
the conventional energy. The optimal strategy of a prosumer
depends on the strategies of other prosumers. We, thus, model
the strategy selection problem of a prosumer as a game
theoretic problem. The strategy space of a prosumer inherently
depends on the strategy of other prosumers since the amount
of energy a prosumer can buy inherently depends on the
amount of energy other prosumers want to sell. We, thus,
seek to obtain a generalized Nash equilibrium. We show that
the game admits a concave potential function. We propose a
distributed algorithm where each prosumer only selects its own
optima strategy. The platform selects the exchange price for
each prosumer. A prosumer does not need to know the other
prosumer’s utilities. It only needs to know the strategy taken
by a prosumer in the previous iteration to find its own in the
current iteration. The platform updates the price depending on
the supply and demand. We show that the distributed algorithm
converges to the unique generalized Nash equilibrium, and the
optimal exchange price. In the optimal exchange price, total
conventional energy consumption is reduced, the peak load is
reduced.
We do not consider how the ISO should set the parameter
γt. The characterization of the optimal γt is left for the future.
We consider a real time price which varies linearly with the
total demand. The characterization of the generalized Nash
equilibrium for other non-linear function, and its impact on
the efficiency ratio also constitutes an interesting research
direction. The impact of the uncertainty of the renewable
energy on the equilibrium strategy profile is also left for the
future.
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